Introduction
This essay analyses obedience and role in group dynamics in the light of the works of Christopher R. Browning, Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo.
Christopher R. Browning is a historian; the work examined here is his Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (1992).
Stanley Milgram (1933-84) was a social psychologist who rose to worldwide fame after conducting the experiment that bears his name (1963).
Philip Zimbardo is a social psychologist known for the Stanford prison experiment (1971).
In his work, Browning asks how the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could have played a key role in the Final Solution, given that they were all “ordinary men”, that is, men with no history of violence behind them that could account for the atrocities they committed. His research refers to the work of Milgram and Zimbardo for the mechanisms, respectively, of obedience to authority and of role in group dynamics, which will be examined here.

Reserve Police Battalion 101
Reserve Police Battalion 101, about 500 men strong, was a unit of the German Order Police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo) which, during the National Socialist occupation of Poland, played a key role in carrying out the Final Solution, in particular in rounding up and expelling Jews, Poles and Gypsies, in guarding and liquidating the ghettos, in deportations to concentration camps and in the mass shootings of tens of thousands of civilians.
Stationed in the Warthegau district (western Poland), it is estimated that about 37,000 people were evacuated from their homes over a period of five months, from spring to summer 1940.
In May 1941 the Battalion was sent back to its base in Hamburg, where it was completely rebuilt; its ranks were filled with conscripted reservists and it underwent a period of intensive training. This period coincided with the deportation to eastern Europe of Hamburg’s Jewish population, from October to December 1941. In this phase the Battalion served in many aspects of the deportation process, such as guarding the assembly point, which was the Masonic Lodge of Hamburg, and the railway station where the Jews were loaded onto trains towards their final destinations in Lodz, Minsk and Riga.
In June 1942 the Battalion was stationed in Poland in the Lublin district, where it was used to round up and concentrate Jews from smaller settlements into larger ghettos or camps, such as Izbica and Piaski, the two largest concentration camps in the district.
From July to November 1942 the Battalion was used for mass shootings of Jewish civilians throughout the Lublin district.
It is calculated that between July 1942 and November 1943 Reserve Police Battalion 101 was responsible for the killing of more than 38,000 Jews and the deportation of another 45,000.
Almost all the members of the Battalion survived to the end of the war and returned to Germany. In the immediate post-war period only four members faced legal consequences for their actions in Poland: they were extradited to Poland in 1947 and tried the following year. Two were sentenced to death and the other two to prison. It was only in 1962, however, that the Battalion as a whole was placed under investigation by the Hamburg public prosecutor. In 1967 fourteen members of the unit were put on trial and, although most were convicted, only five went to prison, serving sentences of five to eight years, which were reduced in the course of a long appeal process.
Ordinary men
With the exception of the officers, the reserve lieutenants and the non-commissioned officers, the men who made up Reserve Battalion 101 came from the humblest strata of German society.
Of the rank and file, most came from the Hamburg area and the majority of them, 63%, had held jobs typical of the city’s working class: dockers and lorry drivers, the most numerous, but also many bricklayers, labourers, sailors and waiters. 35% of them were lower middle class and had invariably worked as “white collars”: three quarters of them in sales, the remaining quarter in various offices in both the private and the public sector. The number of independent craftsmen and small business owners was extremely low. Only 2% were professionals of the bourgeois middle class, such as pharmacists and teachers. The average age of the men was 39; more than half were between 37 and 42, a group considered too old for army service but conscripted into the Police Reserve after September 1939.
In essence the men of the Battalion had had no experience of social or geographical mobility; few were economically independent and virtually none had received any further education after leaving the Volksschule (comparable to our middle school) at the age of fourteen or fifteen. A high percentage had become party members after 1942; it is not clear, however, how many had been Communists or Socialists and/or trade union members before 1933. It is estimated in any case that this number must have been significant, given their social and geographical origins. Because of their age, all had spent their formative years in the pre-Nazi era, and most came from the city of Hamburg which, by definition, was one of the least “Nazified” cities in Germany. Most came from a social class that had been anti-Nazi in its political culture.
One can conclude that these men formed the least likely group from which to recruit the mass murderers needed for the Final Solution.
The action at Józefów
The setting and the extraordinary offer
After its deployment in the Lublin area, in June 1942 the Battalion received orders for a “special action”, the nature of which was not specified in the written orders, but the men were led to believe it would be a matter of guard duty. The action would turn out to be the first real test of mass murder that Reserve Police Battalion 101 would have to face. There is no indication that at the time even the officers suspected the true nature of the task they would be called upon to carry out. The Battalion arrived at first light in the town of Józefów, having left nearby Biłgoraj at about 2 in the morning. Before the action the Battalion commander, Major Wilhelm Trapp, a man in his fifties who had been a veteran of the First World War as well as a professional policeman, had the men assemble and here, after setting out the details of their terrible task, made an extraordinary offer: any of the older men who did not feel up to the task awaiting them could step forward. After a few moments one man, Otto-Julius Schimke, stepped forward and, once he had seen that nothing bad would happen to him, another ten or twelve men also stepped forward. To these men Trapp assigned tasks at the margins of the whole action that was to take place over the rest of the day.
The plan
Trapp then gave his orders to the company commanders. Two platoons (about 30 men each) of Third Company were to surround the village; the men were explicitly told to shoot anyone attempting to escape. The remaining men were to round up the Jews and bring them to the market square. Those who were sick or too frail, those who resisted or tried to hide were to be shot on the spot. The men of First Company were to be divided as follows: a first group would guard the “work Jews”, while the second would take up position in the nearby forest to form firing squads. Second Company would shuttle, using the Battalion’s lorries onto which the Jews would be loaded, between the market square and the forest.
The execution and its effect on the men
Major Trapp spent most of the day in Józefów and never went to the forest or saw the executions; his absence from the scene was noticed by the men. One witness reported hearing him say: “Oh, God, why did I have to be given these orders…” as he put his hand on his heart. On another occasion he confessed: “… such jobs are not for me. But orders are orders.” In yet another case: “Major Trapp was pacing nervously back and forth and suddenly stopped in front of me and looked me straight in the eye and asked whether I approved of all this. I answered: ‘No, Herr Major!’ He then started walking again and wept like a child.” While Major Trapp despaired, his men carried out the orders. The Jews were brought out of their homes; those who could not move fast enough or resisted were shot on the spot. It was a small town that was soon full of screams and gunshots, and everyone could hear what was happening. Along with the elderly and the sick, many reported the presence of the bodies of children among the others left everywhere in the houses, in the doorways and in the streets of the town. It seems, however, that the men found it hard to shoot the children, and avoided doing so; the children were often seen in the company of their mothers, who held them in their arms or led them by the hand.
In the forest the victims were divided into groups and each squad was paired with an equal number. The bulk of the victims remained at the edge of the forest while small groups were led inside; then shots were heard, and the squads that had gone in shortly before with their escort reappeared with their uniforms stained with blood, took another group, and so on.
Once in the forest the squads followed the inner tracks until they reached a place where a non-commissioned officer, who was looking for suitable spots, showed them where to go. The victims were ordered to lie face down on the ground in a row; then the soldiers of the squad came up behind them and, in unison, using the bayonet as a guide, shot them in the head or the neck.
For those who had not accepted Trapp’s offer, it is likely that only now did they realise the consequences of their decision. Some men of First Company approached First Sergeant Kammer telling him they could not go on; he assigned them to guard duties just outside the perimeter of the forest. During the day others approached him and were assigned other tasks, away from the shooting.
Others still made the mistake of approaching Captain Wohlauf (who was also an SS-Hauptsturmführer), saying that they too were fathers and that they could not go on. He refused their requests, saying that they could, if they wished, lie down with the victims. Later, however, Kammer dismissed these men too, together with a number of other soldiers who were then allowed to return to their quarters at Biłgoraj.
Other policemen who were unable to ask to be excused found other ways of evading their task.
In the town, during the first round-up actions, some men of First Company hid in the garden of the town’s Catholic priest and stayed there for some time; then, fearing their absence might be noticed, they went to the market square and took one of the lorries to the forest, having themselves driven back and forth so as to have an excuse for their absence.
Others still spent an impossible amount of time in the houses they entered so as not to have to round up the Jews.
The situation was no better in the firing squads. Many men tended to miss their victims on purpose, and the non-commissioned officers had to finish the job with “mercy shots”.
Among the first, Franz Kastenbaum, who had denied remembering anything about the killing of the Jews during his official post-war interrogation, suddenly appeared uninvited at the office of the Hamburg prosecutor who was investigating the actions of Reserve Police Battalion 101. He said he had been a member of a squad of seven or eight men who had taken their victims into the forest and shot them at point-blank range; this procedure was repeated up to the fourth victim: “The shooting was so repugnant to me that I missed the fourth man. It was simply no longer possible for me to aim accurately. I suddenly felt nauseous and ran away from the shooting site. […] It was not that I could no longer shoot properly, rather that I intentionally missed that fourth man. I then ran into the woods, vomited, and sat down against a tree. I shouted out loud, because I wanted to be left alone. Today I can say that my nerves were totally finished. I think I stayed there for two or three hours.” It seems that some, after the first shot fired at a victim, could no longer shoot; in general it is calculated that the men could no longer continue the task after shooting between ten and twenty victims.
Those who tried to avoid carrying out their tasks, or who later declared that they were no longer able to, suffered no consequences for their actions.
In stark contrast to the inner conflict experienced by the men of the Battalion, after the first shots and the realisation of their fate the victims assumed an attitude that witnesses would later describe as one of “calm” or “extraordinary composure”, which seemed to exasperate the executioners even further.
As dusk fell on that long summer day, the executions became less and less organised and more frantic. At 9 in the evening the last Jews were killed; it is estimated that the total number of victims at Józefów was about 1,500. Wearily the soldiers gathered in the market square to begin the journey back to the Battalion’s quarters. The bodies in the forest were left where they lay; the great mass of suitcases and personal belongings in the market square that had belonged to the victims was set on fire. No valuables were officially requisitioned, but it is presumed that some of the policemen enriched themselves with watches, jewellery and money taken from the victims.
When they returned to their quarters, witnesses would later report, the soldiers were depressed, angry, bitter and shaken. Few ate, but they drank heavily of the alcohol generously offered, and many became drunk. Trapp handed out bottles and filled glasses, saying that responsibility for what had happened lay with the high command; and yet, despite the alcohol and the Major’s attempts at consolation, no one could wash away the sense of horror and shame that pervaded the barracks. Trapp explicitly asked that what had happened not be spoken of, but the men needed no encouragement in that direction, and those who had not been in the forest did not want to know the details. The whole affair became taboo. But that did not stop the nightmares: during the first night after the Józefów action, one of the men woke up shooting at the ceiling of the barracks.
After Józefów
After Józefów, the morale of the Battalion’s men continued to fall, even among those who had not actively taken part in the shootings. One of the policemen told Sergeant Kammer: “If I have to do it again I will go mad.” Others who met the requirements made use of a regulation whereby older men with large families to support had to sign a waiver before entering a combat zone. One who had not signed refused to do so; another who had signed withdrew his signature. All of these had to be transferred to Germany. Many asked for a transfer, and their efforts were eventually rewarded.
For the unit to go on functioning within the general framework of the Final Solution, the demoralisation factor had to be kept as low as possible. For this to be possible there were two important changes: first, Reserve Police Battalion 101 was to operate only in the clearing of ghettos and in deportations, and not in direct massacres on the spot which, in the Lublin district, were instead carried out by the Treblinka extermination camp. Second, the Battalion was to be supported by the Trawniki, auxiliaries recruited from the areas of the Soviet Union then under Nazi occupation or from among prisoners of war, specially trained by the SS, to whom the worst tasks in the clearances and deportations generally fell.
These men, and the camps that did most of the “dirty work”, gave the Battalion a measure of psychological relief that was necessary for it to go on functioning within the mechanism of the Final Solution. When further “special actions” were required, the Battalion gradually became ever more efficient in carrying out part of those orders that at Józefów it had found so hard to complete.