Conclusion
ANALOGIES
Having examined the history of Reserve Police Battalion 101, Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority and the Stanford prison experiment on role pressures in group dynamics, analogies can be drawn between the behaviour of the men of the Battalion and the behaviour of the subjects in the experiments mentioned above.

Many of Milgram’s insights can be incorporated into the framework of the actions that took place at Józefów; however, in the story of the “special action” there are too many variables to take into account, and the event can never perfectly fit the rigorous requirements that can only be met in the context of a controlled experiment. First of all, the structure of authority was very complex compared with the experimental one. Major Trapp represented an extremely weak authority figure, and the orders received for the action came from the “high command”, an authority that was influential, yes, but also extremely remote from the realities of the Battalion. Milgram observes that people tend to invoke authority more often than conformity to explain the reasons for their behaviour, since authority clearly has the power to absolve them of direct responsibility. Yet many policemen seem to have responded to conformity more than to authority, out of concern for how they would be seen in the eyes of their comrades. This was clear during Trapp’s extraordinary offer, when only 12 men out of 500, about 2.4%, accepted. When, however, the men were not supervised by authority they did whatever was in their power to avoid carrying out the task assigned to them; this phenomenon too seems well modelled by one of the variants of Milgram’s experiment in which the researcher, at a certain point, leaves the room telling the subject to continue on his own. In this variant the percentage of subjects who went on to administer the highest shocks dropped markedly. Likewise the Battalion’s subsequent behaviour after Józefów is well explained by the lifting of responsibility, or at least its diffusion, brought about by the intervention of the Trawniki.

Other phenomena are better explained by the Stanford prison experiment. First of all, it is clear that the men of the Battalion were immersed in a hostile reality represented by the war and by the fact of being in an occupied country. In this setting the policemen played the role of occupiers, or victors, while the members of the local populations had the role of the occupied, or the defeated. In this ever new and ambiguous situation the units had to be tightly cohesive against any external threat, imagined or real. The fact of carrying weapons and performing a task in which the subjects had the power of life and death over their victims could not fail to produce the effects of strong peer pressure within the ingroup and an equally strong devaluation of the members of the outgroup. In this sense, ideology gave these men a frame of reference on which to base the meaning of their actions. In particular, propaganda and indoctrination, and other social phenomena converging with them, must have played a key role in enabling the men of the Battalion, albeit at the cost of a terrible inner conflict, to carry out the massacre that took place at Józefów. As in the Stanford prison experiment, it is calculated that a group of just under 20% of the Battalion adapted to the experience of the massacre, indeed learned to love it and to become more efficient and creative in carrying it out; likewise another group, again under 20%, seems to have consisted of those who explicitly accepted Trapp’s extraordinary offer and those who tried to avoid any involvement as far as possible. The remaining group, the majority, consisted of those who did their duty by conforming to the wishes of the group. Zimbardo’s experiment models well the brutality of the behaviour of some policemen, the inertia of the others in the face of it, and the docility of the victims.
Other psychological theories: the dispositional perspective
Other psychological theories have tried to explain the events that took place within the Final Solution, focusing on the dispositional characteristics of the men who committed the most brutal acts.
Among these we will cite here the contribution of Theodor Adorno, a philosopher and sociologist who, within the frame of reference of psychoanalysis, developed the concept of the “authoritarian personality”.
Adorno started from the hypothesis that certain deeply rooted personality traits made “potentially fascist individuals” particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda.
To this end a list was compiled of crucial traits, derived from and tested on a purpose-built scale (the F scale), that prevailed in the “authoritarian personality”.
In particular these were: rigid adherence to conventional values; submission to authority figures; aggression towards outgroups; opposition to introspection, reflection and creativity; a tendency to superstition and stereotyping; a preoccupation with power and “toughness”; destructiveness and cynicism; a tendency to project one’s own unconscious contents; an exaggerated concern with sexuality.
Other scholars adapted Adorno’s theory to include environmental variables as well; this is the case of John Steiner, who introduced the concept of the “sleeper”, that is, certain personality traits in potentially violent individuals remain latent until activated under certain circumstances. According to his theory, a large number of people who scored high on the F scale had been attracted by Nazism and its “culture of violence”, in particular by the SS, which offered incentives for the full realisation of their violent potential.
Yet another scholar, Ervin Staub, accepted the notion that it is the individual’s subjective characteristics that select him into the groups that will then commit the most heinous acts, but he also admits that the “sleeper” turns out to be an extremely common trait, so that under certain circumstances anyone would be capable of acts of extreme violence and/or destruction of human life.
It should be noted, however, that in Nazi Germany many paths were already open to those who scored high on the F scale, paths that could well have developed the “sleeping potential” of these men. For this reason it seems odd that Reserve Police Battalion 101 should have had such men in its ranks; indeed, one could argue that a mass conscription would have gathered subjects with a low F-scale score, since most of the others would already have been employed elsewhere. In short, one can conclude that the dispositional perspective is not very convincing in explaining the behaviour of the ordinary men involved in the Final Solution in general, and of the Battalion during the Józefów action in particular.
Other intervening phenomena
Here we have examined the phenomena of obedience to authority and of role in group dynamics, and asserted that they explain much of the behaviour of Reserve Police Battalion 101 during the Józefów action. It is clear, however, that other intervening phenomena also influenced the final outcome.
Among these it is worth mentioning: surprise, gradualness, anonymity and cognitive dissonance.
It is immediately clear that most of the men who formed Reserve Police Battalion 101 did not know what the true nature of the tasks they would have to perform during the special action at Józefów would be. Those men were taken by surprise and soon found themselves in a tangled web of conflicting social norms. Faced with the ambiguity of the situation and its immediacy, informational social influence generally prevails: the phenomenon whereby a subject looks to the behaviour of others to draw information from a situation otherwise devoid of evident meaning, and conforms to it even when this may put his life in danger. So many did, before Otto-Julius Schimke decided to step forward and accept Major Trapp’s offer. Had he not done so, in all likelihood no one in the Battalion would ever have stepped forward.
Gradualness is a phenomenon visible in Milgram’s experiment, where the subjects had “only” to administer each time a shock of slightly higher intensity than the previous one, and to it can be attributed the behaviour of the Battalion after the special action: having already committed an inhuman act, subsequent actions, though not directly brutal, were carried out also because they were, gradually, only slightly worse than what they had already done.
Subjects who can act violently, in violation of “universally shared” norms, greatly increase their violent responses if they can do so under conditions of anonymity. During the Stanford prison experiment the guards were required to wear large sunglasses, so that part of the line of their faces was hidden or distorted. As for the Józefów action, the Battalion arrived “out of nowhere” at first light, vanished at dusk, and the inhabitants of that town never saw those policemen again. This state of affairs certainly created the conditions under which the members of the Battalion felt they were acting in anonymity, making their responses particularly violent precisely because circumstances allowed it.
Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), whereby if a subject acts in contrast with his own beliefs, notions or personal opinions, in circumstances where he cannot change the environment in which the dissonance developed, he will permanently modify his behaviour or his attitude towards the action he has performed in order to re-establish a “cognitive consonance” that lets him see himself in a better light. In the case of the Battalion, all those who did not step forward after Trapp’s offer implicitly agreed to carry out their tasks within the special action; there is no doubt that some of them changed their attitude by integrating their actions into their belief system, de facto “embracing” the National Socialist cause of a Europe without Jews.

The impersonal mechanism, last words
Browning concludes his book Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland by stating that, rather than to the individual characteristics of the men who formed Reserve Police Battalion 101, the blame for the actions those men carried out should be attributed to an impersonal mechanism, necessary and inherent in the otherwise good functioning of social groups. Ordinary men who in every respect are no different from us, who indeed are us. Even though none of those men can be excused for the actions carried out during those fateful years between 1941 and 1943, because there were men who, faced with a choice, decided not to kill and suffered no negative consequences for it, the implications of Milgram’s experiment are disturbing: if those men in those circumstances became ruthless murderers, what group would not?
Milgram himself, dismayed by his findings, writes: “Even Eichmann was sickened when he toured the concentration camps, but to participate in mass murder he had only to sit at a desk and shuffle papers. At the same time the man in the camp who actually dropped Cyclon-B into the gas chambers was able to justify his behavior on the grounds that he was only following orders from above. Thus there is a fragmentation of the total human act; no one man decides to carry out the evil act and is confronted with its consequences. The person who assumes full responsibility for the act has evaporated. Perhaps this is the most common characteristic of socially organized evil in modern society.”
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